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Does language have a downtown? 
Wittgenstein, Brandom, and the game of 
“giving and asking for reasons” 
 
 
 
P I E T R O  S A L I S  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations proposed an egalitarian view about language 
games, emphasizing their plurality (“language has no downtown”). Uses of 
words depend on the game one is playing, and may change when playing 
another. Furthermore, there is no privileged game dictating the rules for the 
others: games are as many as purposes. This view is pluralist and egalitarian, 
but it says little about the connection between meaning and use, and about how 
a set of rules is responsible for them in practice.  
Brandom’s Making It Explicit attempted a straightforward answer to these 
questions, by developing Wittgensteinian insights: the primacy of social 
practice over meanings; the idea that meaning is use; the idea of rule–following 
to understand participation in social practices. Nonetheless, Brandom 
defended a non–Wittgensteinian conception of discursive practice: language 
has a “downtown”, the game of “giving and asking for reasons”. This is the idea 
of a normative structure of language, consisting of advancing claims and 
drawing inferences. By means of assertions, speakers undertake 
“commitments” that can be challenged/defended in terms of reasons (those 
successfully justified can gain “entitlement”). This game is not one among 
many: it is indispensable to the very idea of discursive practice.  
In this paper, my aim will be that of exploring the main motivations and 
implications of both perspectives. 
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Does language have a downtown? 
Wittgenstein, Brandom, and the game of 
“giving and asking for reasons” 
 
 
 
P I E T R O  S A L I S  
 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
 ANGUAGE GAMES ARE EXAMPLES of ordinary word use that Wittgenstein 
presents in Philosophical Investigations to attack and dismiss the pictorial 
or “representational” view of language and meaning that he proposed 
and defended with the Tractatus Logico–Philosophicus. These examples are 
contrived to show that language is not a tool or activity that performs just one 
task. Describing the facts of the world is one use of language, but it is just one 
among many others. In fact, with language we can ask questions, give directions, 
pray, count objects, swear, give orders, marry someone, and many other things. 
Wittgenstein puts great emphasis on this plurality of resources. The descriptive 
uses, furthermore, are not even central among these: all language games stand 
on a par. 
Language games also played a fundamental role in the “pragmatist” route 
traced by Wittgenstein: speakers of a language must be understood as 
“participants in a practice”. One’s use of words depends on the language game 
one is playing, and it may change when playing a different game. For 
Wittgenstein, there is a fundamental connection between making moves in a 
language game and participating in a social practice. This connection highlights 
the normative character of such practices, in accordance with Wittgenstein’s later 
theme of “rule–following”: the proper participants in a practice are those who act 
according to certain rules; this holds also for linguistic practices, or language 
games. Yet, in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein proposes an egalitarian 
view of language games, emphasizing their plurality (“language has no 
downtown”).1 There is no privileged game dictating the rules for all the others; 
there are as many games as purposes. This view is both “pluralist” and 
 
1 Wittgenstein (1953). See especially §18. 
L 
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“egalitarian”, but it says little about the particular connection between meaning 
and use, or about how a set of rules is responsible for both in practice. The 
underlying reason for this, we will see, is Wittgenstein’s so–called quietist attitude, 
his fundamental view that theorizing about such things is something we cannot 
do.2 
A non–quietist approach towards theorizing characterizes the work of Robert 
Brandom. With his monumental Making It Explicit, he attempts a straightforward 
answer to questions concerning the nature of language and meaning by 
developing, in a constructive way, certain Wittgensteinian insights: the general 
primacy of social practices over meanings, looking to the use of words to 
understand their meanings, and the idea of understanding participation in social 
practices as rule–following. Despite his following these insights, Brandom 
defends a mainly non–Wittgensteinian conception of discursive practice. 
Language, for Brandom, has a “downtown”, what he calls the game of “giving and 
asking for reasons”. This is the idea of a normative structure of discursive practice, 
consisting in the activities of advancing claims and drawing inferences.  
According to Brandom, the game of “making assertions” is also relevant to 
other games.3 By means of assertions, speakers undertake “commitments” that 
can be challenged or defended in terms of reasons (with those successfully 
justified gaining “entitlement”). By asserting a statement with a certain content, 
a speaker undertakes implicit commitments to the appropriateness of the 
statement and of its consequences. These commitments can be made explicit, 
evaluated, and even challenged when needed. When a speaker successfully 
defends a commitment that has been challenged, by means of good reasons, she 
becomes entitled to the content of her claim.  
Commitments and entitlements, as normative characterizations of the 
linguistic moves made by speakers within discursive practice, are particularly 
interesting philosophically because they are a relevant alternative to “truth” in 
evaluating the goodness of assertory moves. What actually decides, regarding 
 
2  The term “quietism” in connection with Wittgenstein’s late philosophy was first used by Crispin Wright. 
See Wright (2001, p. 169). This is the idea that philosophy, in a fundamental sense, is not a theory. For a 
wider presentation see Macarthur (2017). 
3  The centrality of the game of assertion and the connected centrality of “judgment” as the unit of 
pragmatic significance should not be interpreted as a kind of “global descriptivism” as, for example, Ernst 
Michael Lange seems to do (Lange 2015, p. 261). According to Brandom, assertion is not explained in 
terms of “truth” or according to a “representational” model. His account of assertion, to the contrary, is 
neither truth–conditional nor representational. His inferentialism provides an expressivist alternative to 
such a reading; assertions are explained in terms of inferential “commitments” and as “moves” affecting 
the deontic statuses of speakers (see below).  
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being entitled or not to certain commitments, is not the “truth”4 of the claims at 
stake; the explanatory notion used in this semantic framework is just that of 
inference —Sellars’ “material inference”, to be precise.5 The asserted claims are 
appropriate when they are uttered in the “right circumstances” and when they 
entail the “right consequences”. References to the circumstances and the 
consequences of application of a claim are the right sort of reasons for defending 
it or dismissing it, as is appropriate. This assertoric practice should not be 
understood as leaning towards a descriptivist conception of language. The fact 
that truth here does not work as an explanatory notion, together with the general 
idea that goodness of inference is not explained in terms of truth, constitutes a 
challenge to the representationalist conception of assertion. In fact, as we will 
see, Brandom endorses a weak anti–representationalism and a kind of 
expressivist perspective that conceives vocabularies as generally non–reducible to 
descriptivist accounts (representational vocabularies excluded). These points, 
taken together, are not only a basis for rejecting a strictly representational 
account of language; they are also the basis of a pragmatist type of “pluralism 
about vocabularies”, in which different vocabularies have different expressive 
power. 
On this basis, perhaps surprisingly and despite prima facie appearances to the 
contrary, I will conclude that Brandom’s inegalitarian conception of language 
games as being governed by the game of giving and asking for reasons —let us 
call it the “downtown view”— is a more robust and principled philosophical 
pluralism than Wittgenstein’s therapeutic and quietist egalitarian attitude. This 
is argued in two main steps. First, I argue that Brandom endorses a “pluralism of 
contents” with his nonrepresentational account of assertion (anti–
representationalism) and a direct pluralism about vocabularies and their 
expressive powers (expressivism). Second, I argue for the negative view that 
Wittgenstein, qua theoretical quietist, would have rejected “philosophical” 
pluralism as a philosophical “thesis”, despite his recognizing and embracing the 
plural nature of ordinary practices and games as a barrier against monist 
philosophical temptations (as was his earlier pictorial view in the Tractatus).  
 
 
4  Brandom endorses a deflationary attitude towards the explanatory role of truth talk. See Brandom (1994, 
chap. 5). 
5  Material inferences are those that are good not only on the basis of their logical form, but also on the 
non–logical concepts involved. For example, the inference from “Felix is a cat” to “Felix is a mammal” 
depends in an important way on the concepts “cat” and “mammal”. See Brandom (1994, 2000). See also 
Sellars (1953). For a reconstruction of the genesis of Sellars’ idea in Carnap, see Turbanti (2017, p. 71). 
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§ 2. Wittgenstein and the plurality of language games: therapeutic 
tools to escape from an image 
The plurality of language games in Wittgenstein’s Investigations is neither a flag 
nor a manifesto—and not only for Wittgenstein’s philosophical contrariety to 
such things. It is more a piece of evidence of the limits and problems of his former 
descriptivist and pictorial conception of language. As presented in his Tractatus, 
this was the idea that language primarily “depicts” extra–linguistic facts, and that 
there is a fundamental isomorphic correspondence between language and reality 
in virtue of their sharing a common logical form—words represent, or depict, 
objects. 
This pictorial conception promoted a descriptivist understanding of 
language: the usefulness, and the main point, of language was to say how things 
are in the extra–linguistic world. Furthermore, these descriptions were to work 
in a representational way: our statements directly correspond to facts.6 The 
connection between language and reality depends on the nominalist idea that 
words and sentences (logical connectives aside) work as names, referring to their 
bearers. Just as names refer to objects, truth–functional combinations of names 
(and descriptive predicates) refer to extra–linguistic combinations of objects 
(and to their properties and relations). This, very roughly, is the main thesis of 
the Tractatus, which Wittgenstein later wanted to discredit and dismiss.  
In the first paragraphs of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein gives 
examples showing how our ordinary practices often do not conform to such a 
representational conception of language. In §2, the workers communicating with 
utterances like “Slab!” cannot be understood as “representing”, “depicting”, or 
“describing” slabs—they do not mean anything like “this is a slab”—but rather 
they are giving a precise order: “bring me a slab!” They are “playing a different 
game”. When one enters a store with a slip marked “five red apples”, as in §1, 
there is a crucial difficulty in understanding it according to the denotational 
model—its meaning is not “these are five red apples”. Words like “five” or “red” 
work differently because they are used differently. The word “five”, for example, 
does not refer to a putative thing (say, the platonic entity 5).7  
Wittgenstein’s strategy puts a methodological focus on two main features: that 
we use language in many different, perhaps irreducible, ways; and that we 
participate in many different practical activities.8 Language is a plurality, a 
 
6  Wittgenstein (1922), see for example 2.1–2.13, 3.2, 3.21, 4.12. 
7  Such considerations are usually connected with the so–called “placement problem”. See below. 
8  See for example §130 of the Investigations. 
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“toolbox” we use to participate in various practical activities, various language 
games. Wittgenstein uses language games systematically to emphasize the 
plurality of our linguistic activities as evidence against the former monist 
conception of language in which it is entirely devoted to describing the world. 
This pluralism, at least in the first part of the Investigations, has a mainly negative 
motivation: to deny the representational–denotational conception of language 
and to affirm a strong connection of human language with diverse practical 
activities.  
Since, for the later Wittgenstein, philosophical “theorizing” makes little sense, 
these are not positive philosophical doctrines or recipes.9 Pluralism and 
pragmatism are therapies—general strategies to dismiss an intuitive, but wrong 
and uncomfortable, philosophical conception of language—not attempts to 
promote a substantial philosophical alternative, to state official philosophical 
views. This means also that Wittgenstein is not, in general, defending pluralism 
as a philosophical claim. He is rather describing the plurality of human activities 
and defending it from representationalist philosophical “imperialism”, as 
something that does violence both to our practice and to our understanding of 
language by reducing it to merely “representing how things are”.  
In this general context, Wittgenstein’s egalitarian view of language games can 
be introduced. When Wittgenstein claims that the way we use words depends on 
the language game we are playing, and that different words belong to different 
games, he is not proposing a general rule like: language games are on the same level 
just as different words are on the same level or as different practices are on the same level. 
Neither is it a rule like: language games are on the same level because privileging the 
descriptive use of language is ill–fated. His egalitarianism about language games is a 
corollary of his appreciation of the plurality of practices, and it contrasts with the 
very idea of a philosophical view that gives meaning and order to language and 
practice from above —as the representationalism of the Tractatus, seeing 
language as “describing the facts”, attempts to do. The egalitarian attitude of the 
Investigations takes a step back from such a questionable enterprise, not to defend 
a substantial philosophical thesis, but rather to promote a negative, therapeutic 
attitude toward the very idea of establishing such points based on general 
conceptions.10 
 
9  See for example §128: “If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate 
them, because everyone would agree to them”. See also §124 and §§126–127. Furthermore, the proper 
job of philosophy is describing rather than explaining. See especially §109. 
10  Here, the most famous passage expressing such attitudes is certainly §133: “[…] The real discovery is the 
one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. — The one that gives 
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§ 3. Wittgenstein’s pluralism and social normativity: the rules of 
the games 
Another important dimension of plurality connected with language games is 
rule–following. According to Wittgenstein, when we play a game, we do so by 
following its rules. Language games are activities guided by norms. We are 
recognized as players of a particular game when we make the right moves and 
avoid making the wrong ones—and it is not enough simply to believe we are 
following the rules.11 The fact that we are actually acting according to a certain 
rule is not something that is determined only by our own conduct: the way in which 
other players recognize and assess our action as appropriate or not is 
fundamental. Following a rule, in this sense, is not a solitary enterprise. 
Furthermore, whether one is playing by the rules depends on the accepted norms 
of the game, which vary across a plurality of games. In his attempt to describe 
what we actually do in our ordinary practices, Wittgenstein focuses on the rules 
that we follow and on the peculiar ways we adopt to follow the rules. For example, 
the game of “counting” requires following rules that are quite different from 
those we follow in the game of “naming”. In different language games we use 
words differently, and this means using them according to different rules. 
Speaking is a normative activity like many other practical activities (it can be done 
correctly or not). A language game, from this perspective, can be understood 
both as a context of use for words as well as a set of normative instructions for their 
correct use. 
This pluralism about rules is also therapeutic in spirit; it does not impose or 
defend a substantial philosophical claim. Wittgenstein is just registering how we 
act ordinarily to dismiss what he thinks is a wrong conception. We follow a set of 
rules because the very activity works de facto in this way. Following the rules is 
simply what we do in ordinary practice. By looking at how we actually behave, as 
opposed to making adventitious philosophical claims from outside of the practice 
(which would come at the risk of “colonizing” it), Wittgenstein takes a step back 
from philosophical theorizing. The method endorsed by Wittgenstein here is 
quite clear: trying to describe our activities without being misled by explanations 
in terms of general conceptions and principles. 
From this point of view, Wittgenstein does not defend pluralism as a 
philosophical doctrine; he defends the plurality of actual practices, language 
 
philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question. […] There 
is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies”. 
11  See, in particular, Wittgenstein (1953: §202).  
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games, and rules that we follow, against the invasion of monistic philosophical 
conceptions like the representationalism of the Tractatus. He seems to warn us 
against certain natural tendencies and conceives philosophy as a therapeutic 
activity for resisting such tendencies. Often, this therapy serves just to discover 
the peculiar ways in which we actually act, believe, and speak, which suddenly 
become visible once we remove the lens of some general philosophical 
conception or cease to be misdirected by some simple superficial appearance. 
This sometimes requires the “special attention” of philosophers to be discovered: 
“We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of our language–games 
because the clothing of our language makes everything alike”.12 This passage 
denounces the very “clothing” of language as something superficial and 
potentially misleading, something that can wrongly invite unitary or monistic 
readings that mask the underlying plurality of language games. The plurality of 
language games stands as a collection of hard facts contraposed to our —perhaps 
natural— tendency to start theorizing about language by projecting general 
images and unitary conceptions. Yet, again, it is a plurality of facts rather than a 
theoretical, principled, pluralism.13  
There is therefore an important connection between Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical quietism and his defense of the plurality of language games. This 
plurality of practices, uses, and rules, is neither the basis nor the substance of a 
philosophical view; it is rather the basis of a quietist “step taken back” from 
philosophical theorizing and similar tendencies. Philosophical theorizing and 
focusing on an explanandum through general images are here understood as 
clearly connected —and the therapy is meant to cure both aspects of the disease.  
 
§ 4. Brandom’s privileged game: the centrality of asserting 
Even though inspired by a number of lessons from the late Wittgenstein, 
Brandom is not at all a theoretical quietist. To the contrary, he proposes a 
systematic theory of discursive practice that consciously develops, in a 
constructive way, many Wittgensteinian insights. Brandom’s conception of 
language is based on three main pillars: an inferentialist conception of 
conceptual content; a normative pragmatics of discursive commitments and 
entitlements; and a general expressivism according to which discursive practice 
permits to make explicit, in propositional form, what we implicitly do in 
 
12  Wittgenstein (1953: §224). 
13  The passages in §§23–24 of the Investigations can very easily be read in this way. 
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practice.14  
According to Brandom’s inferentialism, conceptual content depends on 
certain inferential moves or transitions between statements. For example, the 
content of “Felix is a cat” depends on its being a good premise from which to 
infer “Felix is a mammal” and on its being a good conclusion from “Felix purrs”; 
these moves constitute our grasp of that claim. We grasp concepts, and 
conceptually articulated claims, by means of our mastery of certain inferences, 
material inferences, whose goodness does not depend only on having valid logical 
form but also on the contents of the non–logical concepts involved. From this 
point of view, “Felix purrs” and “Felix is a mammal” are useful in spelling out the 
content of “Felix is a cat”. This semantics understands these inferential moves in 
normative, not causal, terms: “Felix purrs” is a reason to utter “Felix is a cat”, not 
what causes it.15 Such an account of meaning is devoted to explaining the 
proprieties of the use of linguistic expressions; it is therefore a kind of 
“theoretically constructive approach” to Wittgenstein’s legacy. Though many 
interpreters have argued that Wittgenstein did not promote a substantial use–
theory of meaning, his idea of looking at the use of words in order to grasp their 
meaning (Wittgenstein 1953, §43) is one that opens the way to such constructive 
attempts and indeed influenced a number of proposals. Brandom’s 
inferentialism is certainly one of the prominent attempts —along with, e.g., 
Wilfrid Sellars’ and Michael Dummett’s accounts— inspired by this legacy. 
According to normative pragmatics when we advance a certain claim C, whose 
content depends on a number of inferences, we undertake a special set of 
responsibilities concerning C: we are committed to having good grounds for 
uttering C and to accepting what follows from C. When challenged about C we 
can show that we have reasons that support it, and so we are entitled to it. The 
practice of advancing, challenging, and defending claims is the game of giving 
and asking for reasons. Here, by undertaking and attributing commitments and 
entitlements by means of reasons —i.e., by spelling out claims by means of 
suitable inferences and then assessing them— speakers acquire deontic status 
from the social recognition that their linguistic performance conforms to the 
right reasons or not. In this view, therefore, discursive entitlement is understood 
as a basic scheme of default and challenge. Discursive practice in a social group 
involves reckoning the deontic scores of speakers, what Brandom calls “deontic 
scorekeeping”: every speaker keeps the score of his own and other speakers’ 
 
14  For recent presentations that focus on this tripartite understanding see Salis (2016) and Turbanti (2017). 
15  See Peregrin (2014), and Turbanti (2017), for a special insistence on this contrast between a normative 
understanding of inferentialism and other causal accounts. 
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commitments up to date, distinguishing the commitments each is or is not 
entitled to. This conception shows a constructive approach to Wittgenstein’s idea, 
namely, that participation in a practice is rule–following. The rules that govern 
discursive practice in particular are norms that Brandom, inspired by 
Wittgenstein (1953: §219), understands as implicit. As Wittgenstein writes, we 
follow the rules blindly, without full awareness of their content.16 
The inferential articulation of conceptual contents and the normative 
structure of discursive practice invite an expressivist understanding of their 
connection. This understanding is provided by what Brandom calls “logical 
expressivism”: this is the idea that logical vocabulary makes conceptual contents 
and relations explicit. The normative practice of undertaking commitments by 
means of assertive moves is complemented by the capacity to defend such claims 
by spelling out their contents —by making the implicit supporting inferences 
explicit (in propositional form). Inference is here a basic move that we make in 
discursive practice, but it is also something that can be made explicit by means of 
conditional expressions, and such spelling out helps us to elucidate conceptual 
contents. This is possible on the basis of an expressivist reading of logical 
expressions such as conditionals. Conditional expressions make explicit “what 
follows from what” in the context of our assertive moves when a particular 
assertion is challenged by an interlocutor. They work, according to this 
perspective, as inference licenses, whereby certain good inferential transitions are 
made explicit. This possibility is fundamental when we are interested in 
establishing whether a particular inference is good or bad. This assessment is 
crucial, because such material inferences are normatively responsible for the 
contents of our assertions and commitments. Therefore, these expressive 
resources, among many others, are special in improving the reckoning of deontic 
scores of speakers. According to a general expressivist conception, many 
vocabularies that we deploy and adopt improve our general capacities for action 
and cognition by permitting us to specify in many useful ways what we do in our 
practices.17  
If the game of giving and asking for reasons, with the combination of 
expressive resources that it carries, is a fundamental normative practice, then, 
according to Brandom, this means crediting it as a kind of “center” or 
 
16  Brandom’s defense of the implicit nature of discursive norms is heavily influenced by Wittgenstein’s 
arguments, or by certain readings of them. See Brandom (1994, pp. 20–30).  
17  See, for more details, the special diagrams (meaning–use diagrams —MUDs) deployed by Brandom to 
make certain expressive relations between practices and vocabularies explicit. See Brandom (2008). See 
below for a more detailed account of expressivism in the relations between vocabularies. 
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“downtown” for discursive practice. This, on the basis of our former 
reconstruction, appears opposed to Wittgenstein’s pluralist and egalitarian 
attitude towards language games. The following is an interesting passage where 
Brandom endorses such a view by marking an explicit distance from Wittgenstein: 
 
What makes something a specifically linguistic […] practice is that it accords some 
performances the force or significance of claimings, of propositionally contentful 
commitments, which can both serve as and stand in need of reasons. Practices that do not 
involve reasoning are not linguistic or (therefore) discursive practices. Thus the ‘Slab’ 
Sprachspiel that Wittgenstein introduces in the opening sections of the Philosophical 
Investigations should not, by these standards of demarcation, count as a genuine Sprachspiel. 
It is a vocal but not yet a verbal practice. By contrast to Wittgenstein, the inferential 
identification of the conceptual claims that language (discursive practice) has a center; it is 
not a motley. Inferential practices of producing and consuming reasons are downtown in the 
region of linguistic practice. Suburban linguistic practices utilize and depend on the 
conceptual contents forged in the game of giving and asking for reasons, are parasitic on it. 
Claiming, being able to justify one’s claims, and using one’s claims to justify other claims 
and actions are not just one among other sets of things one can do with language. They are 
not on a par with other ‘games’ one can play. They are what in the first place make possible 
talking, and therefore thinking: sapience in general. Of course we do many other things as 
concept users besides applying concepts in judgment and action and justifying those 
applications. But […] according to this sort of semantic rationalism, those sophisticated, 
latecoming linguistic and more generally discursive activities are intelligible in principle 
only against the background of the core practices of inference–and–assertion (Brandom 
2000, pp. 14–15). 
 
For Brandom, the game of giving and asking for reasons is not merely one among 
many: it is indispensable to the very nature of discursive practice. This game of 
assertion plays a fundamental role within discursive activities. It is, in Sellars’ 
jargon, an autonomous practice, “a language–game one could play though one 
played no other” (Brandom 2008, p. xvii). Prima facie, this centrality seems to tell 
against the endorsement of a pluralist attitude, especially when Brandom says 
that the game of giving and asking for reasons is not on a par with other games. 
This inegalitarian statement seems to invite a reading according to which 
assertory practice comes first, while all other language games are second rate. 
On the contrary, since this is not a representationalist conception of assertion 
and language is not understood as a denotational device, this game is rather a 
sort of “contentless general scheme” for endorsing, challenging, and eventually 
rejecting assertive moves bearing all kinds of content. Once we stop 
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understanding the game of assertion via a kind of general descriptivism18 and 
stop understanding assertion in terms of “truth” or “accurate representation”, we 
find ourselves free from this image. I can defend in terms of reasons —i.e., in 
terms of good inferences— claims about how things are in the world as well as 
claims dealing with normative or aesthetic evaluations. These claims profit not 
only from the very fact that we have practices devoted to performing such 
evaluations, but also from the fact that we have adopted certain vocabularies that 
improve those practices in a decisive way. The game of giving and asking for 
reasons is the practice in which we make assertions using the conceptual 
resources provided by all our vocabularies, in which we say that things are thus 
and so, that the death penalty is wrong, that a landscape is beautiful, and so forth.  
Therefore, the game of giving and asking for reasons shapes our moral and 
aesthetic claims in terms of reasons, just as it shapes our stating and describing 
facts. We have multiple special vocabularies —the normative, the logical, and 
many others— that are useful for certain aims and practices. Thanks to them, as 
Brandom says, we can say and do many things that we could not say or do without 
them. And they enable us to specify, in many ways, our moves within discursive 
practice. The game of assertion —understood in terms of the giving and asking 
for reasons, not in representational or truth–conditional terms— is particularly 
fit for explaining the correctness of clearly nonrepresentational claims, including 
moral, logical, mathematical, probabilistic, and other claims. These various 
vocabularies count as expressive resources that we deploy to achieve a form of 
progress that is both cognitive and practical. This is a core feature of Brandom’s 
expressivist conception of vocabularies. 
Huw Price —another theorist who embraces an expressivist and anti–
representationalist perspective— wrote the following about this contrast between 
Brandom and Wittgenstein: 
 
Brandom doesn’t claim that making assertions is the only game we can play with language, 
of course, but he does claim that the assertoric game is both central and indispensable. 
Contrasting his own view to Wittgenstein’s, he explains that his view requires that language 
‘has a downtown’ – that assertion is a fundamental linguistic activity, on which others 
depend (Price 2013b, p. 32). 
 
18  This anti–descriptivist view was first defended by Sellars. The locus classicus is the following: “[…] once 
the tautology ‘The world is described by descriptive concepts’ is freed from the idea that the business of 
all non–logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an ungrudging recognition that many 
expressions which empiricists have relegated to second–class citizenship in discourse are not inferior, just 
different” (Sellars 1957, §79).   
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The expressive preeminence of the game of giving and asking for reasons is a 
fundamental element for the functional diversification of the vocabularies we 
deploy, for the improvements we may contrive, and for those vocabularies still to 
be deployed; this is the main reason why there must be a “downtown” in discursive 
practice. The game of giving and asking for reasons is the general platform from 
which we manage and deploy our multifunctional expressive resources; it is the 
practice devoted to assessing the goodness of our inferences involving concepts 
from various vocabularies, from ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary to the 
metalanguages that we develop and use to specify and illuminate this vocabulary 
in many ways. At this point, we should look more closely at the connection 
between this game and the pluralism of vocabularies. 
 
§ 5. Brandom’s downtown: discursive practice, expressivism, and 
pluralism 
According to representationalism, language is used to describe the world, and 
the job is well done if the descriptions are accurate representations of the 
reported facts. The idea is that there is a general correspondence between 
linguistic expressions and facts; for example, the statement “the cat is on the mat” 
corresponds to the fact that there is actually a cat on the mat. So far, this has an 
intuitive appeal, but it is just half of the story. If we consider statements like “the 
death penalty is wrong”, “the Sagrada Familia is beautiful”, “snow is very unlikely 
today”, or “the truth of a conjunction depends on both the conjuncts being true”, 
things change. The notion of correspondence with the facts loses much of its appeal. 
To keep it in place, we would need to endorse what Brandom and Price call 
“metaphysical extravagance”: we would need moral facts, aesthetic facts, 
normative facts, probabilistic facts, logical facts, and many others, corresponding 
to the various kinds of statements.19  
Expressivism is, firstly, the rejection of this representationalist understanding 
of language.20 It says, roughly, that language is a collection of vocabularies 
performing various functions, which are hardly reducible to mere representation. 
When we use normative vocabulary, for example, we are not representing norms 
or normative facts, but making normative claims that deal with other statements 
 
19  This is often called the “placement problem”. See Price (1992, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c) and Brandom (2013). 
20  Simon Blackburn’s quasi–realism is a straightforward expressivist reply to this challenge dealing 
specifically with moral vocabulary. For a reconstruction of this perspective in a wider expressivist 
context, see Blackburn (1993, 2013) and Price (2013b, 2013c).  
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or actions. The use of vocabularies of philosophical interest —normative, modal, 
semantic, and so forth— permits us to achieve particular goals because such 
vocabularies permit us to perform moves that would not be possible otherwise. 
Representationalism alone is unable to account for the many uses of language. 
According to Brandom’s expressivism, certain expressively powerful 
vocabularies permit us to make some things propositionally explicit that would 
otherwise remain implicit in our practices. The idea that certain 
metavocabularies play such an elucidating role is fundamental for this kind of 
expressivism. The power to elucidate, to make the content of certain notions 
explicit, provided by a new adopted vocabulary is akin to a practical 
empowerment; it permits one to say, to think, and to do things that were not 
possible before the adoption. Imagine, for example, that we were deprived of the 
use of arithmetical vocabulary. How many activities and practices would become 
much more difficult or impossible? It would be both a cognitive and practical 
catastrophe. 
The function played by such vocabularies is better understood by looking at 
the example of logical vocabulary. This vocabulary —including “and”, “or”, “not”, 
“implies”, and so on— permits us to make it explicit that a certain consequence 
follows from a particular statement. By mastering conditional expressions —such 
as the conditional “if X is a cat, then X is a mammal”— I can make it explicit that 
“Felix is a mammal” follows from “Felix is a cat”. This is a fundamental expressive 
resource for our linguistic practices, one that also offers a straightforwardly 
plausible alternative to positing putative and extravagant “conditional facts” as 
corresponding to the use of conditionals. Logical negation plays a similar role 
dealing with incompatibilities between statements. By mastering the locutions of 
negation, one can point out that certain statements are mutually incompatible, 
that one cannot endorse both. Losing the expressive power given by conditional 
expressions or negation would amount to a “radical impoverishment” of 
discursive practice, to the point of its becoming something else. According to this 
logical expressivism, such a loss would amount to a collapse of the possibility of 
our making propositionally explicit what we do in discursive practice. 
Brandom promotes a perspective according to which many other vocabularies 
of philosophical interest can be understood similarly. Every expressively powerful 
vocabulary, according to Brandom, embodies a form of “local” expressivism: 
these vocabularies, which Brandom defines properly as pragmatic metavocabularies, 
correspond to specific ways in which we may be empowered in relation to specific 
goals. For example, we have the expressive power of the representational 
vocabulary, of “truth locutions”, of the normative vocabulary, and many others. 
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Just as the logical vocabulary plays an elucidating role, making conceptual 
contents explicit, these vocabularies permit us to explicitly characterize certain 
aspects of what we say and do in connection with possibility and necessity, 
correctness and incorrectness, aboutness, and so forth. They provide substantial 
improvements to our practices, particularly our discursive practice, which 
coordinates the use of such vocabularies.  
Local expressivism here is a kind of “pragmatist pluralism” about our most 
important vocabularies of philosophical significance.21 These vocabularies differ 
because they are useful for different tasks; the expressive improvement of our 
vocabularies, in principle, can be as multidirectional as the plurality of our goals 
and activities. The vocabularies that Brandom presents as embodying forms of 
local expressivism (normative, modal, intentional, and so forth), in fact, play a 
mainly plural metalinguistic function: they specify, each in its own terms, what we say 
and do in our discursive interactions.  
However, this plurality of vocabularies should not, says Brandom, be 
interpreted as a sort of “mutual independence” of vocabularies: different 
vocabularies may be connected to others by what Brandom calls “pragmatically–
mediated” relations. For example, normative vocabulary and modal vocabulary 
are strictly connected: we could use the normative vocabulary as a pragmatic 
metalanguage to specify the practice of making modal claims. A modal statement 
like “It cannot be Monday today and not be Tuesday tomorrow” can be read as 
implicitly containing conditionals that work as inferential licenses, and hence as 
norms.22 The pragmatically–mediated relations between specific vocabularies 
implies that the plurality of vocabularies does not entail an egalitarian view of 
vocabularies: not all vocabularies have the same level of expressive power. For 
example, ordinary empirical descriptive vocabulary is of fundamental importance 
for discursive practice (in general, for every autonomous practice);23 without it 
we could hardly have discursive practice (or other vocabularies) at all. Very 
roughly, we could describe the hierarchy of expressive vocabularies as having an 
 
21  See Price (1992: 388). Price considers this feature as almost Wittgensteinian in spirit: “something akin to 
a Wittgensteinian linguistic pluralism”. However, this is a point where Brandom and Price differ in their 
endorsing expressivism: Price endorses, in fact, a global version of expressivism, extending the expressive 
analysis to all possible vocabularies and not only to certain expressively powerful vocabularies of 
philosophical interest, as Brandom does. See Price (2013b, 2013c) for a wide discussion about such 
differences. 
22  Brandom (2008, p. 104). The example is taken from Gilbert Ryle. 
23  See Brandom (2008, p. 3). As the former example, dealing with the relation between normative and 
modal vocabularies, shows, such vocabularies can play metalinguistic functions dealing with our use of 
other metalanguages.  
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ordinary empirical observational vocabulary as its base, a practical layer 
permitting the possibility of assertive and inferential moves, and then the various 
pragmatic metavocabularies that help us to specify and to improve what we say in 
the base vocabulary and do in the practice. This hierarchy confers a central 
position to some vocabularies and impedes an easygoing egalitarian assimilation. 
This anti–egalitarian attitude, prima facie, suggests a contrast with pluralism. 
Usually, inegalitarian views about vocabularies have been considered “anti–
pluralist” in spirit. Richard Rorty famously complained about understanding 
certain vocabularies as more fundamental or significant than others in virtue of 
their putative correspondence with reality. Rorty called for a culture liberated 
from the bad metaphors of “correspondence” and “accurate representation” and 
claimed that pluralism was the main upshot of this pragmatist liberation. This is 
not mandatory, however. One can be pluralist even granting a different weight 
to different vocabularies; the preeminence that Brandom assigns to some 
vocabularies is immune from Rorty’s criticism, since it is based on expressive 
power, not on correspondence with the way things are. In a sense, the centrality 
of the game of assertion is what warrants and permits the “pluralist proliferation” 
—the multifarious blossoming— of other vocabularies. The hierarchy of 
expressive power can be understood more as a pluralist expansion of discursive 
practice than as a substantial obstacle to it. 
The connection between the centrality of the game of assertion and a 
pragmatist and expressivist pluralism about vocabularies is efficaciously 
contrasted with a Wittgensteinian attitude in the following quotation by Price: 
 
[…] Brandom’s project is to link different kinds of vocabulary to different kinds of practices 
and pragmatic tasks. So while Brandom’s account may impose a degree of uniformity on 
language that some Wittgensteinian pluralists might wish to reject –offering us a uniform 
account of the way in which Wittgenstein’s common linguistic ‘clothing’ is held together, 
so to speak– it not only allows but actually requires that this uniformity coexist with an 
underlying functional diversity of the kind that expressivists such as Blackburn and Gibbard 
require. It not only allows but insists that different pieces of linguistic clothing do different 
things, even though there is an important sense in which they are all put together in the 
same way and all belong to the same assertoric game (Price 2013b, p. 34). 
  
There is, therefore, no real tension between the expressivist prominence of the 
assertoric game and the plural diversifications of our vocabularies. The game of 
giving and asking for reasons is not just one vocabulary among others; it is rather 
an underlying condition for their development, improvement, and 
diversification. 
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Despite appearances, therefore, pluralism is not the underlying source of the 
contrast between understanding language as having or not having a “downtown”. 
Both views are quite open to pluralism and, in general, both meet important 
requirements of pluralist philosophers —they both subscribe to fundamentally 
anti–representationalist lessons, for instance. From this point of view, their 
common dismissal of representational accounts of language shapes a general 
agreement that is far wider than their difference with respect to recognizing a 
downtown in our language. 
 
§ 6. Conclusion: pluralism beyond downtown and 
representationalism 
Does language have a downtown? Is such a downtown a problem for pluralism? 
Did Brandom and Wittgenstein reply to the very same question by diverging on 
this point? Or were these just different responses to very different questions? 
According to our reconstruction, Wittgenstein denies the idea of a downtown 
in language in his very attempt to undermine the representational–denotational 
model of language presented in the Tractatus. He wants to affirm especially that 
the representational model of the Tractatus is not downtown in linguistic 
practices. The late Wittgenstein’s target is general descriptivism, not the idea of 
a “privileged” or “special” language game, an eventuality which he does not even 
mention. He was stunned and impressed by the rich diversity of ordinary 
linguistic practices, in contrast with the representational model of the Tractatus. 
He probably just wanted to give due emphasis to his important discovery. To 
attribute to him a substantial view of language that rules out (or admits) certain 
special explanatory features would be to ignore his well–known theoretical 
quietism. So, we have a number of reasons to think that he would not be 
interested in systematic attempts to understand language, such as Brandom’s.24 
Should we understand Brandom’s defense of a downtown in language as a 
substantial obstacle to pluralism? Is his view a regress in understanding language 
from the point of view of Wittgenstein’s egalitarian pluralism about language 
games? According to our reconstruction, Brandom’s downtown is thoroughly 
compatible with pluralism: in an important sense, it is the key feature that permits 
the very proliferation of different vocabularies. The game of giving and asking 
for reasons is downtown precisely because it plays a quite different role than those 
played by other vocabularies. In an important sense, it is not a vocabulary: it is 
rather the very structure of developing, using, and improving our vocabularies. 
 
24  The later Wittgenstein might, however, have been tempted or interested in expressivism, I would guess. 
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And it is a structure that fits almost all types of content coming from different 
disciplines and vocabularies. 
Brandom and Wittgenstein diverged on a “downtown of language” at the 
question of the nature of philosophical theorizing and the possibility of isolating 
relevant explanatory features to provide a systematic philosophical account of 
language. While Wittgenstein saw the reference to “practices and use” as an 
unavoidable limit to our philosophical understanding of language, Brandom had 
the advantage of knowing that pragmatics can be a fruitful object of philosophical 
understanding, one that can be helpful in developing a systematic account of 
language. Their difference in views does not depend only on attitudes about 
philosophy, but also on their endorsement of different premises —about 
pragmatics, for example. When Wittgenstein was working on his Investigations, 
pragmatics, as we know it, did not even exist as an autonomous discipline. They 
also differed with respect to their endorsement of expressivism (though 
Wittgenstein was of fundamental importance in influencing it). Their difference 
in premises and presuppositions is particularly relevant to shaping their general 
attitudes.  
According to these reconstructions, the real differentiator between the two 
prima facie opposing conceptions of language is certain attitudes concerning the 
scope and nature of philosophical theorizing. We have a sharp contrast between 
a straightforward quietism —a kind of “no–theory” view, suggested by 
Wittgenstein, that sees philosophy as therapeutically expelling misleading 
conceptions derived from superficial conflations and misunderstandings— and 
a positive, systematic, theoretical investigation into the structure of discursive 
practice, as proposed by Brandom’s work. Without entering into the evaluation 
of the support for these contrasting views,25 we might grant Brandom’s 
perspective a certain advantage, since his had the opportunity to incorporate 
important lessons coming from the wide and highly refined discussions of the 
second half of the 20th century (many of which followed Wittgenstein’s ideas and 
insights). The role of pragmatics is one such lesson; a self–aware conception of 
expressivism as a theoretical possibility is another. These are ideas of great 
importance in transforming Wittgenstein’s remarks on “meaning and use” within 
the philosophical project of providing a systematic theory of meaning as use. 
Here, the legacy of Dummett and Sellars plays a crucial role in Brandom’s 
perspective. In a sense, the feasibility of theories of meaning is almost taken for 
granted in the argumentative context where Brandom moves, while 
 
25  See Brandom (2019) for a detailed discussion of this contrast. 
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Wittgenstein’s quietism is certainly not the mainstream view.26 
According to this fundamental difference in attitude, we could conclude that 
many important aspects of Brandom’s philosophy can be understood as attempts 
to look at Wittgenstein’s lessons with a “constructive spirit”, to go beyond his 
quietist reservations. What Wittgenstein thought were insurmountable obstacles 
to theorizing about language —for example, the diversity of ordinary practices— 
have become, in Brandom’s perspective, as well as in philosophy of language in 
general, legitimate objects of philosophical investigation.  
This contrast leads, finally, to a surprising upshot. In an important sense, 
Brandom’s inegalitarian conception of language games, with its master idea of a 
game of giving and asking for reasons, ends up as a “philosophically principled” 
type of pluralism —what we might call a genuine type of philosophical pluralism— 
in which pluralism can be defined and defended on the basis of explicit 
principles. Wittgenstein’s egalitarian conception of language games, on the 
contrary, cannot be understood as a philosophical pluralism strictu sensu. His 
quietism —his reluctance to advance philosophical theses, in general— prohibits 
Wittgenstein from endorsing pluralism as a substantial view. This does not mean, 
in an important sense, that Wittgenstein is not a pluralist. He is clearly a pluralist 
in spirit, and he clearly adopts a pluralist strategy in his therapeutic perspective 
on language; he would just deny that pluralism is a valid philosophical thesis or 
truth. He would, perhaps, reject it as a principled view.  
 
26  Even though varieties of quietist attitudes have been endorsed by important philosophers such as John 
McDowell and Richard Rorty. See McDowell (1996) and Rorty (1982). For a wider overview on quietism 
see Macarthur (2017). 
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